Reflexive experience of John Dewey’s pragmatic dimensions about knowledge and truth
Abstract
The origins of John Dewey's theories are early discussions about the classic duality of the real and the ideal. One of the most important manifestations of this duality can be traced in the separation of «knowledge» from «act». The mind is seen as an act of «reason», separated from the vulgar and universal world of practical. The idea that knowledge is a passive and high act, one of the highest aspirations of man, entered into the traditional definition of reason. The modern concept of science is a reflection of this definition. But it has a long history, starting with the Greeks, who first separated the theory from practice. For them, the study of the scientific phenomenon was both a cosmological mystery, and a peculiar complicated game. Greek philosophers believed that practical arts and crafts are beyond their control. Their world is more suitable for ethics, music and math. Significant influence of the Greeks was recognized and reflected by the historians of philosophy and science. Professor Whitehead's famous remark is that «the most reliable general characteristic of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of Plato’s references». Koestler argues that this statement should be read as follows: «science, up to the Renaissance, consisted of a series of Aristotle’s references».
Truth and knowledge are free from absolute interpretation. John Dewey insists on rejecting the Greek concept of absolute knowledge. He argues the need to replace it with existential and practical knowledge, to erase the Aristotelian understanding of knowledge. When the practice of cognition ceases to be dialectical and experimental, knowledge has become driven by changes, and testing of knowledge has become the ability to cause certain changes. Demonstration, for experimental sciences, means a certain kind of reasonably performed action; it ceases to be contemplative and becomes true in the true sense. Now this means that philosophy must also change its essence by acquiring practical content.
